

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00255 01 OF 03 250822Z

11

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DRC-01 /153 W

----- 008059

P R 241745Z SEP 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0429

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0255

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT,
TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: CANADIAN PRESENTATION AT
SEPTEMBER 24 PLENARY

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. AT THE SEPTEMBER 24 PLENARY MEETING
OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, STATEMENTS WERE DELIVERED BY
THE CANADIAN REP (GRANDE), THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP
(KLEIN), AND THE ITALIAN REP (CAGIATI); TEXTS OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAK AND ITALIAN STATEMENTS ARE BEING
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00255 01 OF 03 250822Z

TRANSMITTED BY SEPTELS. THE CANADIAN STATEMENT, AS

APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP SEPTEMBER 23, CONTAINS A RECAPITULATION OF THE OVERALL ALLIED POSITION AND GOES ON TO REFOCUS ATTENTION ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. THE CANADIAN STATEMENT RECALLS THE FOUR ALLIED LINKAGE PROPOSALS, AND UNDERSCORES THE PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE OF THE "ALL PARTICIPANTS" FORMULA. GRANDE'S STATEMENT URGES THE EAST TO RESPOND CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THESE "FARAREACHING PROPOSALS" IN ORDER TO REACH COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE "WHOSE FORCES" ISSUE AND "TO FORESTALL PRESIMISM." THE TEXT OF THE CANADIAN STATEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS: END SUMMARY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

1. MR. CHAIRMAN,

TODAY'S PLENARY MEETING MARKS THE BEGINNING OF THE FOURTH ROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING FOR NEARLY A YEAR NOW. WHILE MUCH USEFUL DISCUSSION HAS TAKEN PLACE, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE ACTUAL PROGRESS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT.

2. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HOPE FOR MOVEMENT IN THIS ROUND. IF THERE IS NO SUCH MOVEMENT, WORLD OPINION WILL GRADUALLY BECOME PESSIMISTIC AS TO THE ABILITY OF THIS FORM TO PRODUCE RESULTS. OUR GOVERNMENTS CONTINUE TO DESIRE A POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THESE TALKS AND THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS STILL BELIEVE THAT WE CAN REACH A PHASE I AGREEMENT BY NEXT YEAR. BUT IF PARTICIPANTS ARE TO MOVE FORWARD AND FORESTALL PESSIMISM, PRACTICAL PROGRESS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE SOON TOWARDS SOLVING INDIVIDUAL ISSUES. THIS REQUIRES MOVEMENT ON THE PART OF ALL. FOR THEIR PART, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE ALREADY MADE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT IN THE LAST ROUND TO CONTRIBUTE TO A POSITIVE OUTCOME.

3. LET US SEE WHERE WE STAND NOW AS REGARDS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRACTICAL PROGRESS. DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF THESE TALKS, BOTH SIDES PUT FORWARD THEIR BASIC POSITIONS.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00255 01 OF 03 250822Z

IT SOON BECAME APPARENT THAT THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES DIFFERED IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS.

4. THE WESTERN APPROACH WAS PRESENTED IN WESTERN OPENING STATEMENTS AND SET OUT IN THE WESTERN OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 22, 1973. LET ME BRIEFLY RECALL ITS MAIN FEATURES. WE HAVE PROPOSED AS THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN THE TWO

SIDES, IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COMBAT CAPABILITY. OUR PROPOSAL AIMS TO ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY BY DEALING DIRECTLY WITH THE MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN THE AREA: THE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES.

5. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT REDUCTIONS TO A COMMON CEILING SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED IN TWO SUCCESSIVE PHASES, GOVERNED BY SEPARATE AGREEMENTS. IN THE FIRST PHASE, PARTICIPANTS WOULD REACH AGREEMENT OF REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES AND ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. IN THE SECOND PHASE, PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCES, RESULTING IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

6. THIS APPROACH IS A PRACTICAL ONE AND TAKES APPROPRIATE ACCOUNT OF THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE SITUATIONS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THROUGH REDUCING FIRST, THE US AND SOVIET UNION WOULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY ASSURANCE TO THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO ENABLE THEM TO JOIN IN THE REDUCTION PROCESS.

7. UNDER THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED, THE USSR WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE GDR A TANK ARMY, CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS, INCLUDING SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. SUCH A REDUCTION WOULD BE A FIRST MOVE TOWARD A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, AND IT WOULD REDUCE THE LARGE AND DESTABILIZING EASTERN TANK SUPERIORITY. FOR ITS PART, THE US WOULD WITHDRAW 29,000

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00255 02 OF 03 250856Z

11

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DRC-01 /153 W

----- 008355

P R 241745Z SEP 74
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0430
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0255

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT, TURKISH
FOREIGN MINSITRY

US SOLDIERS FROM THE AREA. TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GEORGRAPHIC
FACTORS IN AN EQUITABLE WAY, THESE SOLDIERS WOULD BE WITH-
DRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT
COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

8. TO MAINTAIN STABILITY ELSEWHERE, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT
IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE
AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE
COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING WITH SPECIAL STATUS. FINALLY, TO
ENHANCE STABILITY AND TO MAINTAIN THE VIABILITY OF ANY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00255 02 OF 03 250856Z

REDUCTION AGREEMENT, WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT PARTICIPANTS AGREE
ON CERTAIN STABILIZING MEASURES AND MAKE APPROPRIATE
PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION.

9. IT EMERGES, EVEN FROM THE BRIEF SUMMARY I HAVE JUST
GIVEN, THAT THE OVERALL AIM OF THE WESTERN APPROACH IS TO
CREATE A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP OF GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL
EUROPE, AND THEREBY STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

10. BY CONTRAST, THE MAIN EFFECT OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD
BE TO PRESERVE THE EXISTING EASTERN ADVANTAGE IN GROUND
FORCES. BY PERPETUATING THE EXISTING FORCE RATIOS AT
LOWER FORCE LEVELS, IT WOULD IN FACT WORSEN THE PRESENT
ALREADY UNSATISFACTORY SITUATION. THUS, IN OUR VIEW, THE
EASTERN APPROACH WOULD DECREASE, RATHER THAN ENHANCE,
STABILITY. MOREOVER, BECAUSE IT WOULD PRESERVE AND
STRENGTHEN THE PRESENT EASTERN ADVANTAGES, IT DOES NOT PROVIDE

AN EQUITABLE GOAL FOR THESE TALKS. IN CALLING FOR THE PROPORTIONAL REDUCTION OF ALL TYPES OF FORCES, THE EASTERN APPROACH FAILS TO DEAL POSITIVELY WITH THE MAIN DESTABILIZING FACTOR IN THE PRESENT SITUATION--NAMELY, THE LARGE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS. IN CALLING FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, THE EASTERN APPROACH FAILS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE SITUATION OF THE US AND USSR AND THE SITUATION OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS; IT THEREBY OVERLOOKS THE NEED TO CREATE--THROUGH PRIOR US-SOVIET EXAMPLE--THE NECESSARY ASSURANCE FOR THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO JOIN IN REDUCTIONS. THE EASTERN APPROACH DOES NOT INCLUDE PROVISION FOR APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES, AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. THE ARGUMENTS OF BOTH SIDES WERE FURTHER ELABORATED DURING THE SECOND ROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. BOTH SIDES CONTINUED TO URGE THE MERITS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS. IN ADDITION, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MADE DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR CERTAIN STABILIZING MEASURES.

12. BUT THE DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SECOND ROUND DID NOT RESULT IN SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS. IT BECAME CLEAR THAT TO MAKE PROGRESS, PARTICIPANTS NEEDED TO FIND A WAY OF BREAKING CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00255 02 OF 03 250856Z

THE SUBJECT MATTER DOWN INTO INDIVIDUAL MANAGEABLE ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED ONE-BY-ONE AND RESOLVED ON A TENTATIVE BASIS, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE OVERALL PROGRAM OF EITHER SIDE.

13. ACCORDINGLY, DISCUSSION DURING THE THIRD ROUND OF THESE TALKS FOCUSSED LARGELY ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IT WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT A PROVISIONAL RESOLUTION OF THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE WOULD FACILITATE DISCUSSION OF FURTHER ISSUES. IT APPEARED TO BE A MANAGEABLE ISSUE RIPE FOR EARLY RESOLUTION.

14. DURING THE COURSE OF THIS DISCUSSION, PARTICIPANTS EXPLORED EACH OTHERS' VIEWPOINTS AT LENGTH. BOTH SIDES DEFINED THE DIFFICULTIES EACH HAD WITH THE APPROACH OF THE OTHER.

15. THE WESTERN SIDE MADE CLEAR WHY THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US CANNOT REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE. THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS CANNOT REDUCE UNTIL THEY HAVE THE NECESSARY ASSURANCE OF PRIOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLAINED HOW THESE PARTICIPANTS ARE IN A DIFFERENT POSITION FROM THE US AND USSR. THEY DO

NOT HAVE THE MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE US AND USSR. THE ENTIRE TERRITORIES OF MOST OF THEM WOULD BE COVERED BY AN AGREEMENT. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, FOR THEM TO REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE ALONG WITH THE US AND USSR WOULD IMPOSE UNEQUAL DEMANDS ON THEM. EFFECTIVE EQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS CAN RESULT ONLY FROM TAKING THE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES IN THE SITUATION OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS APPROPRIATELY INTO ACCOUNT.

16. IN HIS LAST PLENARY STATEMENT, THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE ARE INDEED IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES AMONG DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. BUT HE THEN ARGUED THAT SINCE ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN AWARE OF SUCH DISTINCTIONS ALL ALONG, THE DECISION OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS TO BECOME A DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IMPLIED WILLINGNESS TO OVERLOOK THESE DIFFERENCES AND TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. BUT THIS CONSLUSION IS UNFOUNDED. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00255 02 OF 03 250856Z

NO PARTICIPANT UNDERTOOK ANY SUCH OBLIGATION IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS.

17. THE SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION AMONG THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER. AN AGREEMENT MUST TAKE THIS DISTINCTION INTO ACCOUNT. THE FACT THAT ALL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE DECLARED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET DOES NOT CHANGE MATTERS. THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES IN THE POSITION OF EAST AND WEST FAVOUR POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR MILITARILY BECAUSE OF THEIR PROXIMITY TO THEIR MAJOR ALLY.

18. WHILE MAKING THESE POINTS, THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS NEVERTHELESS DEMONSTRATED DURING THE THIRD ROUND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE SERIOUSLY INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY EASTERN PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST.

19. AT THE OUTSET OF THE DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC IT WAS THE WESTERN POSITION THAT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND USSR SHOULD AND WOULD UNDERTAKE NO SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE.

20. DURING THE THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO MODIFY THAT POSITION. THEY DID THIS IN THE INTERESTS OF REACHING MIDDLE GROUND ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST, AND ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE EASTERN SIDE WAS ALSO WILLING TO MOVE TO MIDDLE GROUND ON THIS QUESTION.

21. THUS, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR PROPOSALS FOR A FIRST PHASE,
THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS MADE A SERIES OF SPECIFIC MOVES IN
RESPONSE TO EASTERN CONCERNS.

22. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ASSERTED THAT THE WEST WAS
WAS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00255 03 OF 03 250834Z

11

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 IO-14

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04 PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07

DRC-01 /153 W

----- 008146

P R 241745Z SEP 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0431

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0255

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY OF TEXT TO NATO DEPARTMENT, TURKISH
FOREIGN MINISTRY

UNWILLING TO SAY WHO WOULD REDUCE, AND BY HOW MUCH, IN THE SECOND
PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, AS ENVISAGED BY THE WEST. IN RESPONSE, WE
STATED OUR READINESS TO AGREE IN A FIRST PHASE ON A SPECIFIC COMMON

CEILING LEVEL WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN BOTH PHASES. PARTICIPANTS WILL RECALL THAT IN OUR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS WE MENTIONED APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS AS AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE LEVEL FOR A COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FOR BOTH SIDES. FURTHER, WE HAVE SAID THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD FOCUS ON THE GROUND FORCES OF NON-US WESTERN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00255 03 OF 03 250834Z

DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

23. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ASKED HOW THEY CAN BE SURE THAT PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS, AS ENVISAGED BY THE WEST, WILL IN FACT TAKE PLACE. IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE SAID WE ARE READY TO WORK OUT WITH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS THE TIME FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN A PROVISION COMMITTING PARTICIPANTS TO BEGIN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A TIME TO BE AGREED.

24. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ASKED HOW, IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS DO TAKE PLACE, THERE CAN BE ANY ASSURANCE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL HAVE A POSITIVE OUTCOME. IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE SAID WE ARE READY TO WORK OUT A PROVISION IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT FOR REVIEW, WITHIN A PERIOD OF TIME TO BE SPECIFIED, OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT AND OF THE RESULTS OF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS UP TO THAT PERIOD, A PERIOD WHICH WOULD REPRESENT WHAT BOTH SIDES CONSIDER A REASONABLE DURATION FOR SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS.

25. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ARGUED THAT, IF ONLY THE US REDUCED ON THE WESTERN SIDE IN PHASE I, THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES, PENDING A PHASE II OUTCOME. IN RESPONSE, WE HAVE STATED THAT IF OTHER ASPECTS OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT ARE SATISFACTORY, WE WERE READY TO ENTER UPON A MUTUAL COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EITHER SIDE BETWEEN THE PHASES OF REDUCTIONS. THE DURATION OF THIS COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED.

26. THE MOVES WE HAVE MADE ARE IMPORTANT. THEY WERE DESIGNED TO MEET IN A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE WAY THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES REGARDING OUR PROPOSAL THAT ONLY THE US AND SOVIET UNION SHOULD REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE, LEAVING ALL ISSUES REGARDING REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO BE NEGOTIATED IN A SECOND PHASE. WE MADE THESE MOVES IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATE THE VIABILITY OF OUR APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

27. BUT WE DECIDED TO GO EVEN FURTHER THAN THIS. TOWARDS THE END OF THE THIRD ROUND, IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE AS CLEAR AND WEIGHTY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00255 03 OF 03 250834Z

A DEMONSTRATION AS POSSIBLE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE, THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED INFORMALLY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A NEW AND EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT STEP TO ROUND OUT THEIR POSITION.

28. I STRESS THAT IT IS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT STEP, REQUIRING A MAJOR POLITICAL DECISION ON THE PART OF THE INTERESTED WESTERN GOVERNMENTS. THE MOVE WE ARE NOW READY TO TAKE IS THIS: WITH REGARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS WHETHER THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES, WE NOW WISH TO TELL YOU THAT THE ALLIES ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS TO AN AGREED COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF EACH SIDE WOULD INCLUDE REDUCTIONS IN THE GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA OF ALL NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. THE ALLIES COULD UNDERTAKE SUCH A COMMITMENT ONLY IN THE EVENT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THE ONLY EXCEPTION IS THE FORCES OF LUXEMBOURG. THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES SHOULD CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STEP.

29. TO SUM UP, THE WESTERN POSITION IS NOW AS FOLLOWS. THE US CONTINUES READY TO REDUCE IN A FIRST PHASE. WHILE THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION NOT TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN A FIRST PHASE, THEY WOULD BE READY TO UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THEIR FORCES IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE OBLIGATIONS WOULD BE THE PROPOSED COMMITMENT OF ALL REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, EXCEPT LUXEMBOURG, TO INCLUDE THEIR GROUND FORCE S IN PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THESE STEPS TOGETHER REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT MOVE IN THE WESTERN POSITION. THEY ARE IMPORTANT AND DESIGNED TO MEET EASTERN INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO REDUCTIONS BY REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

30. AS I MENTIONED EARLIER, THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW BEEN PROCEEDING FOR NEARLY A YEAR. WHILE THERE HAS BEEN MUCH USEFUL DISCUSSION DURING THIS PERIOD, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROGRESS.

31. IT IS TIME FOR PRACTICAL RESULTS WHICH WOULD SOLVE, AT LEAST PROVISIONALLY, INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF THE NEGOTIATION COMPLEX.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00255 03 OF 03 250834Z

THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE GIVEN PROOF OF THEIR FLEXIBILITY AND

OF THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. WE THEREFORE AWAIT A CONSIDERED RESPONSE FROM EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE FAR-REACHING PROPOSALS WE HAVE MADE.

32. THE SUMMER RECESS HAS PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY FOR REFLECTION. WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. ON THE BASIS OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON THIS TOPIC, PARTICIPANTS WOULD THEN BE IN A POSITION TO MOVE ON TO PRODUCTIVE CONSIDERATION OF FURTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES. END OF TEXT.RESOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 SEP 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00255
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740269-0947
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740919/aaaaapzl.tel
Line Count: 505
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 21 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <21 MAR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <21 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: CANADIAN PRESENTATION AT SEPTEMBER 24 PLENARY
TAGS: PARM, CA, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005